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Since the advent of the economic crisis in 2008, institutional reform of collective wage 
bargaining systems, i.e. of institutional structures and bargaining processes, has (re-)emerged 
on the agenda of public policy making in many countries. Especially in the European Union 
(EU) changes to collective bargaining systems gained a lot of momentum with the adoption of 
the Europe 2020 strategy in 2010 (e.g. Storm and Naastepad, 2015). In some EU member states, 
institutional reform was triggered by the European Commission (EC), the European Central 
Bank (ECB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Some collective bargaining systems 
were considered obstacles to labour market adjustment and often institutional change of 
collective bargaining systems was explicitly aimed at solving the economic challenges of the 
time, i.e. high unemployment rates, by increasing labour cost-competitiveness through internal 
devaluation (e.g. Marginson, 2015).  
However, reforms were not unchallenged and the effects of change were sometimes unexpected 
(e.g. Blanchard et al., 2014; Brandl and Ibsen, 2017; Koukiadaki and Grimshaw, 2016). 
Moreover, numerous studies have argued that the internal devaluation strategy was the wrong 
medicine during a recession with depressed aggregate demand (e.g. Stockhammer, 2015; 
Onaran and Obst, 2016; van Gyes and Schulten, 2015).  
Against the background of institutional reforms of collective bargaining systems this article 
investigates the effects of institutional change in collective bargaining systems on economic 
performance. We argue that institutional stability is an important factor for the efficacy of 
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collective wage bargaining and that changes to the institutional structures come with non-
negligible macroeconomic costs. Theoretically, we argue that these costs arise due to the 
disruption of mutual trust between the actors involved in collective bargaining and the resulting 
increase of uncertainty among labour market actors. Building upon literature on the role of trust 
and certainty for economic efficacy (e.g. Uslaner, 2008; Farrell, 2009; Blanchard et al., 2014; 
Dow 2015; Reynaud, 2017), we propose that institutional stability is beneficial for trust 
building between all actors involved in collective bargaining by creating mutual expectations 
and certainty about behaviour which form the basis for stable wage determination and the 
provision of a common good wage policy. Institutional change might therefore lead to short-
to-medium term collective action problems (Olson 1965), an increase in uncertainty (Hodgson, 
1988) and increased transaction costs in labour markets (North, 1990). We test our hypotheses 
on data from 34 countries, from 1965 to 2014, on two key macroeconomic indicators  – 
inflation and the unemployment rate – both of which are commonly used as performance 
indicators of collective bargaining systems (e.g. Calmfors and Driffill, 1988; Soskice, 1990; 
Flanagan, 1999; Blanchard and Philippon, 2004). While there are many scholars arguing that 
trust has a positive effect on collective bargaining, to our knowledge, this study is one of the 
few that actually estimates macroeconomic costs arising from loss of trust between bargaining 
actors due to institutional change. 
The article is structured as follows. First, we review the relevant literature on collective 
bargaining systems and macroeconomic performance. Next, we discuss the importance of 
institutional stability, trust and certainty for the functioning of collective bargaining. We then 
present details on the data, methodological and empirical strategy and test our hypotheses. 
Finally, we conclude the analysis and discuss the implications of our study for policymakers 
attempting to reform labour markets institutions. 
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2. The efficacy of collective bargaining systems  
 
In a letter on 1 February 1938 to President Roosevelt, John Maynard Keynes suggested the 
provision of institutional support for collective bargaining during the Great Depression (e.g. 
van Gyes and Schulten, 2015). The argument in favour of collective bargaining was that it 
enables a stabilization of wages and labour costs and thus reduces uncertainty about future 
costs and prices which in turn reduces uncertainty in the market. Moreover, via collective 
bargaining it is possible to align wage policies to other policy areas and to pursue a coordinated 
and encompassing wage policy, which is compatible with economic goals such as price 
stability and (un)employment (Crouch, 1993; Flanagan, 1999; Traxler et al., 2001). There are 
many examples which show collective bargaining was a key element and component in some 
countries in successful economic policy making, for example in ’controlling’ inflation in the 
1970s (Brandl and Traxler, 2011), in meeting the Maastricht criteria (Iversen, 1999) and since 
the advent of the latest economic crisis in reducing unemployment (Marginson, 2015).  
In the current economic policy context, one predominant direct key macroeconomic function 
of collective bargaining is to improve (labour cost) competiveness by ensuring that wages are 
aligned or even slightly below productivity increases, i.e. that they, on the one hand, produce 
wage moderation and on the other hand, ensure purchasing power, i.e. simultaneously foster 
economic and employment growth (e.g. Dustmann et al., 2014; Gabrisch and Staehr, 2014). 
This dual-aim poses a challenge for collective bargaining actors and processes and the success 
of it depends upon various institutional properties of collective bargaining systems (e.g. Traxler 
et al., 2001). Specifically, based on Olson (1965), the dominant theoretical argument is that 
encompassing bargaining systems cannot externalize the negative consequences of pay 
increases, so they are forced to moderate them. Institutional differences in the degree of 
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encompassment of different bargaining systems are reflected in the degree of centralization 
(Bruno and Sachs, 1985) and coordination of collective bargaining (Soskice, 1990).  
However, as recently stressed by scholars, the effects of collective bargaining depend upon 
additional contextual factors such as monetary policy, the organizational structure of actors and 
compliance between them, and the openness of the economy (Johnston, 2016). While there is 
no clear consensus in the literature on which bargaining system performs best, it is clear that 
institutional structures for bargaining matter and that changes and institutional reforms of 
collective bargaining systems are likely to affect macroeconomic aggregates (Flanagan, 1999; 
Aidt and Tzannatos 2008).  
In previous debates, collective bargaining systems were analysed based on the implicit 
assumption that institutions could be changed with instant effects on the efficacy. With a few 
exceptions (Brandl and Ibsen 2017), largely missing in previous debates is the question of what 
effect institutional change itself has for the efficacy of collective bargaining systems. In this 
paper, therefore we further investigate the effect of institutional change of collective bargaining 
systems and the role of institutional stability in their efficacy by augmenting Brandl and Ibsen 
(2017). We argue that institutional change of collective bargaining systems comes with 
significant costs which might outweigh any potential benefits of the new institutional system 
in the short to medium term. We base this argument on the role of trust and certainty among 
actors involved in collective bargaining and we posit that institutional change may have a non-
negligible negative effect on trust and certainty in collective bargaining. 
 
3. The role of certainty and trust in collective bargaining 
 
The role of uncertainty in and of markets is fundamental to Keynesian economics and 
institutions play an important role in reducing this uncertainty (Dow, 2015). This is because 
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institutions are able to reduce this uncertainty by facilitating the creation of reliable 
expectations and trust in the behaviour of others (Farrell, 2009) which in turn facilitates 
integrative exchange between actors in an uncertain environment (Reynaud, 2017). Numerous 
studies have suggested that trust has beneficial effects on various aspects of socioeconomic 
development (e.g. Zak and Knack, 2001; Beugelsdijk et al., 2004; Algan and Cahuc, 2013).  
As regards the efficacy of collective bargaining, previous literature has continuously referred 
to and hypothesized on the importance of trust and certainty for cooperation and compliance 
which then is expected to lead to beneficial outcomes (e.g. Walton and McKersie, 1965; 
Ashenfelter and Johnson, 1969; Fox, 1974; Bryson, 2001; Blanchard et al., 2014). However 
against that background, the role of trust for the efficacy of collective bargaining has never 
been addressed systematically and empirically. Thus this paper aims to close this gap by 
arguing that trust among bargaining actors enhances the efficacy of collective bargaining and 
that trust is dependent on a stable institutional environment.    
Being aware of the vast and often  controversial literature on the conceptual definition of trust 
(e.g. Beugelsdijk, 2008; Uslaner, 2008), we concentrate on a calculus-approach to trust which 
is defined as a belief that the actors involved in collective bargaining hold about their 
relationship. Trust is also a voluntary decision by an actor to rely on the action of another actor 
without having any (legal) certainty or clear measure of probability, but only the expectation, 
that the act of trust will pay off in the future (Coleman, 1990). Thus if an actor trusts (or not) 
another actor is a function of the expected gain and loss.  
Farrell (2009) argues that mutual trust among actors can be a sufficient mechanism for 
coordination and compliance in order to ensure efficacy, i.e. the production of a public good, 
such as common wage policy. If compliance is low, one actor does not have the certainty that 
other actors will not defect. Such a situation is typical in collective bargaining systems in which 
many actors at different levels are involved (Traxler et al., 2001). Specifically, in collective 
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bargaining systems in which actors in different areas and at different levels exist we can 
differentiate between three main trust relationships between actors. Firstly, there is a trust 
relationship between the two sides in the employment relationship, i.e. between employers and 
unions, within each bargaining unit. Certainty that the counterpart will not defect or shirk 
enhances the probability of a mutually beneficial agreement. Second, there is a trust 
relationship between units at different levels – ranging from single-employer, multi-employer 
to cross-sectoral bargaining structures. On different levels, the rules and norms regarding 
coordination define further characteristics of the institutional structure of the bargaining 
systems. Third, there is a trust relationship horizontally, i.e. across bargaining units on the same 
level. It can certainly not be assumed that trust between actors along the three relationships is 
a given. Furthermore, it can also not be assumed to be stable over time. In fact, there are many 
sources for the disruption of trust which include changes in the institutional structure of 
collective bargaining systems themselves. 
This proposition finds support within other strands of economic literature (e.g. Kingston and 
Caballero, 2009). For example, Blanchard and Philippon (2004) argue that in countries where 
wages are set by collective bargaining, institutional changes might lead to positive effects in 
the long run but are likely to cause negative effects on macroeconomic outcomes in the short 
and medium term. The authors argue that trade unions need to learn the new rules of the game, 
i.e. they need to discover ‘the true state of the economy‘, and until then the efficacy of collective 
bargaining is impaired. Blanchard and Philippon (2004) argue further that trade unions’ speed 
of learning of new rules of the game depends on the collective bargaining system itself and in 
particular on the prior degree of trust between all actors involved. Building upon Blanchard 
and Philippon’s (2004) concept of trust and the speed of learning, we argue that an institutional 
change establishes a new situation in which all actors, including trade unions as well as 
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employers and employers’ organisations, get to know the new rules of the game gradually and 
start re-building mutual trust.  
Arguably, these negative effects of institutional change will most often be temporary, as actors 
readjust agency to new institutions, build up new mutual expectations of behaviour and foster 
trust again. Furthermore, institutional stability assumes trust in the sense that if actors trust each 
other and in the efficacy of the institutions there are little incentives to change the institutional 
structure. However, as the literature on trust has established, trust takes considerably longer to 
build up than to break down (e.g. Fox, 1974; Farrell, 2009). In contrast to previous studies 
focusing on the effects of different institutional configurations on economic performance, we 
therefore expect non-negligible initial costs from institutional changes when trust based on 
mutual expectations about behaviour breaks down. 
Thus, many scholars have argued or assumed that trust has a positive effect on collective 
bargaining. In the following analysis, we build on these arguments and estimate the 
macroeconomic costs arising from loss of trust between bargaining actors due to institutional 
change. We define efficacy loss by the impaired ability of collective bargaining to minimise 
inflation and unemployment. We will investigate and measure directly the effect of institutional 
change on economic outcomes. This corresponds with standard macro-economic reasoning 
regarding the transaction-cost-reducing effect of trust (Beugelsdijk, 2006: 372). Without being 
able to go into details about the possibility of analysing trust directly in a macroeconomic 
framework of analyses (i.e. Beugelsdijk, 2008; Uslaner, 2008) we have to consider that the 
effect of institutional change might be driven by other (related) mechanisms such as changes 
in power relations (Brandl and Ibsen, 2017), institutional complementarity (Hall and Soskice, 
2001) or increased levels of conflict because of information asymmetries (Hicks, 1932). 
However, we find that these alternative theoretical concepts are not contradictory but 
complementary to our theoretical concept.   
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4. Institutional change across countries and over time 
 
In our empirical analysis on the effects of institutional change we use a sample which covers 
34 countries and spans a period from 1965 to 2014. Thus our sample is significantly larger both 
in terms of the cross and time section compared to other macro analysis on the efficacy of 
different collective bargaining systems (e.g. Calmfors and Driffill, 1988; Soskice, 1990; 
Traxler et al., 2001, Johnston, 2016) and therefore enables us to draw general conclusions upon 
the effect of institutional change on the efficacy of collective bargaining. Table 1 documents 
the data on the predominant collective bargaining system and institutional change for the 34 
countries. 
 
- Table 1 about here - 
 
The large number of countries covers a wide range of very different institutional structures and 
contextual factors in which collective bargaining takes place. The sample, moreover, covers 
changes in various directions: changes towards higher levels and more coordinated forms of 
collective bargaining structures and towards lower levels and more uncoordinated structures. 
As regards the context of collective bargaining, the long time period has the advantage that it 
covers different phases in the business cycles. Taken together, the sample thus allows a high 
degree of generalization of the results.  
Different from previous studies, we are interested in the effects of change in the institutional 
structure of collective bargaining and not the effects of the different institutional structures. 
Thus the focal explanatory variable in this study is a measure of institutional change. We base 
our measure of institutional change of collective bargaining on changes in the categorization 
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of collective bargaining coordination by Visser (2017) which covers all of the three trust 
relationships. The categorization is based on variations in the level at which collective 
bargaining takes place, the actors involved and the extent of integrative interaction 
(coordination/governance) among actors and units within a particular institutional framework. 
According to the above theoretical reasoning, any change in a country from one of the above 
institutional structures to another, implies negative effects on the efficacy of collective 
bargaining. As differences between the categories are significant, a change from one category 
to another is also a significant change.  
Any change from one category to another in one year to another implies that different actors, 
on different levels and with different relationships, are involved in collective bargaining. 
Consequently we operationalize our change measure by defining a change in a country from 
one year to another from a particular institutional structure to another as one change which is 
numerically expressed by 1. We moreover, hypothesize that there is an effect of the change on 
economic performance independent whether the change lead to an increased centralization or 
to a decentralization of collective bargaining. What matters is that the institutional structures 
and the relevant trust relationships among different actors have changed. Because of the change 
in the institutional structure actors involved need to learn the new rules of the game which 
includes the need to get to know each other and to start re-building mutual trust. Like Blanchard 
and Philippon (2004) we argue that until new rules have been learnt, the efficacy of collective 
bargaining is impaired independently from direction of the institutional change. However, we 
do not assume that all changes have the same effect and we also expect that in some countries 
and periods the negative effects of changes vary significantly. Against the background that in 
different countries actors are embedded in very different socio-political and economic 
environments, we also expect that the case specific effects of the institutional change might be 
very high in some cases and might be even absent in other cases. In fact, in some countries and 
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periods actors might build up mutual trust and restore the efficacy of collective bargaining 
almost instantly while in others the process is very long. However, it would go beyond the 
scope of this paper to analyse in sufficient detail the effects of case specific changes and 
therefore we concentrate on the aggregate level in order identify general effect. Nevertheless, 
as a robustness test we analyse asymmetries in the effect by differentiating between changes 
towards more coordinated and centralized institutional structures and vice versa.  
We acknowledge the possibility that changes in the institutional structure of collective 
bargaining might be induced by weak economic performance, i.e. high unemployment and 
inflation. For this reason, reverse causality has to be taken into account in our modelling 
strategy and empirical analysis. We address this issue of reverse causality in different ways. 
We start by using the Granger causality test to gain evidence whether causality runs from 
institutional change to economic performance or the other way round. By analysing a wide set 
of ‘usual’ lag lengths (e.g., Campos and Nugent, 2002), which ranges from 2 to 6 years in our 
case, the Granger test provides us with some evidence on the direction of causality.  
 
- Table 2 about here - 
 
The results in Table 2 show that we cannot reject the hypothesis that institutional change does 
not Granger-cause inflation but we have to reject the hypothesis that inflation does not Granger 
cause change. Thus the Granger test suggests that Granger causality runs one-way from change 
to inflation. As regards unemployment the results of the Granger test do not provide any 
evidence for any clear unidirectional causality. In particular there is no support that changes 
and reforms of collective bargaining are Granger caused by developments in unemployment. 
Furthermore, as can be seen in Table 2, the test results are robust for a wide lag structure. Thus, 
the Granger tests support the argument that the reasons for changes and reforms of collective 
 12 
bargaining systems can be rather found in an economic policy making ’Zeitgeist’ and not in 
well informed decision-making. This, of course, does not rule out that specific reforms were 
well informed. However, over a long period it appears that changes/reforms are not 
systematically implemented when inflation and/or unemployment is high or low. This in turn 
suggests that reforms might be explained by something else. Nevertheless, as will be discussed 
in the following, we further control and consider any potential issues arising due to 
endogeneity.  
 
5. Modelling strategy and empirical analysis 
 
In the following analysis we test the effect of institutional change on inflation and 
unemployment rates using panel regression models. Both dependent variables are derived from 
literature and have become standard indicators for the performance of collective bargaining 
systems (Calmfors and Driffill, 1988; Soskice, 1990; Iversen, 1999; Traxler et al., 2001; 
Blanchard and Philippon, 2004). In addition to the focal explanatory variables, i.e. institutional 
change, we include a comprehensive set of control variables, grouped in four categories.  
The first category relates to the economic context and includes yearly (i) economic (GDP) 
growth, (ii) changes in the exchange rates (to US Dollar), (iii) changes in the terms of trade, 
(iv) changes in the openness of the economies defined by countries’ imports and exports, and 
(v) inflation for explaining the unemployment rate and vice versa the unemployment rate for 
inflation. All these variables aim to control for different economic environments in which 
collective bargaining and institutional change takes place. The second category of control 
variables relates to other aspects of the labour relations system and includes typical variables 
such as (i) trade union density, (ii) the fragmentation of the union system, and (iii) the existence 
and relevance of extension practices in collective bargaining. Closely related to the second 
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category is the third which relates to the institutional structure of collective bargaining 
coordination and includes, besides the focal change variable, the coordination structure and 
collective bargaining coverage.  
The consideration of both variable coordination structure and coverage are crucial. Variable 
coordination structure captures the effect of the institutional structure itself. As shown in 
literature (Calmfors and Driffill, 1988; Soskice, 1990; Traxler et al., 2001) different 
institutional structures are associated with different economic performances. Therefore, the 
effect of the institutional structure before and after the change is likely to be different. Thus, 
the overall effect of the institutional change consists of the effect of the new institutional 
structure and the cost of the change itself. In this paper, we are primarily interested in the latter 
but need to control for differences in the effects of different institutional structures. We 
therefore have to include variable coordination structure. Furthermore, as collective bargaining 
coverage differs between countries and changes over time, the consideration of coverage is 
essential as it captures the effect of the changing relevance of collective bargaining on 
economic aggregates.  
The fourth category of variables includes the remaining controls for other relevant factors. 
Besides a constant it includes lags of the dependent variables (Yt-n) in order to control for serial-
correlations, and a dummy variable for the structural break in Germany due to the unification. 
Furthermore, in order to tackle any potential effects from independent variables due to reverse 
causality, we enter the specification with a one period lag. The estimation result of this 
modelling strategy using Ordinary Least Square (OLS) is shown in model 1a for unemployment 
and 1b for inflation in Table 3. 
In addition, we report the test by additional modelling strategies. In models 2a and 2b we report 
the test by applying a Two-Stage-Least-Square (TSLS) estimation approach. Even though the 
Granger causality test suggests that it is more likely that causality runs from institutional 
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change to economic outcomes, we still do not rule out any potential endogeneity.  The TSLS 
estimation approach uses a change in union authority as an instrumental variable. 
Theoretically, a change in union authority can be expected to affect our key independent 
variable, i.e. the change in the coordination structure of collective bargaining, but does not 
directly affect inflation and unemployment. Because the choice of the instrumental variable is 
sensitive to the analysis, we investigated the correlations between variables change, union 
authority, inflation and unemployment which support the theoretical argument. However, in 
order to increase the validity of the instrument variable approach we also introduce twice-
lagged level variables (Arellano 1989). In addition to that we estimate the previous model by 
considering a full set of country dummies, i.e. by applying a fixed-effects (FE) approach. 
Against the background that the Hausman-test provides some indication that a FE approach 
might be considered this estimation approach comes with some disadvantages because the 
institutional variables change little over time. More specifically, the introduction of FE 
removes the statistical and explanatory power of the institutional variables (e.g. Acemoglu et 
al., 2005). Thus, we report and discuss the models with FE as alternatives to the other models 
to support the robustness of the overall analysis. The results of the FE estimation approach is 
shown for the two dependent variables in models 3a and 3b.  
As hypothesized, we expect that institutional change has a general, negative effect on the 
performance of collective bargaining independently from the direction of change. However, 
we do not expect that the magnitude of the effect is the same across countries and over time. 
In fact, we expect that the magnitude of the effect can vary for changes towards more 
uncoordinated and coordinated institutional structures. In models 4a and 4b we show the results 
of these tests.  
In addition to the models shown in Table 3 and in order to test the robustness of all the models, 
different lag structures of the independent variables were tested and further control variables 
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were included. We also tested if the effect of the collective bargaining structure is non-linear. 
Further tests were made on the timings of change, i.e. in which exact year the collective 
bargaining structure is different. All robustness checks support the results shown. Table 3 
documents the results of all modelling and estimation strategies for both dependent variables. 
 
- Table 3 about here - 
 
Beginning with the effect of institutional change, Table 3 shows that, for both dependent 
variables and in all model variations the hypotheses are supported. Changes to the institutional 
structure of collective bargaining explain a higher rate of unemployment and of inflation. This 
effect holds for all models and for both dependent variables even though the magnitude of the 
effect varies across the different models. This variation is due to the fact that very different 
estimation and modelling strategies are applied, all with advantages and disadvantages - as 
explained earlier - which not only makes comparisons between different models difficult (e.g. 
the magnitude) but is also reflected in the precision of the estimation of the different models 
for the two variables. Overall however, the evidence clearly supports the conclusion that 
institutional change in collective bargaining is costly and causes negative economic effects 
which should be considered in any attempt to reform collective bargaining. As regards the 
effects of the control variables for differences between countries regarding their industrial 
relations system, we can observe that the general effect of the institutional bargaining structure 
itself on economic outcomes is less clearly supported in the different models. The evidence 
shows that only for the unemployment rate some statistical evidence for a significant effect is 
observable for the institutional structure. In models (1a) and (2a) a significant negative 
coefficient can be observed which shows a negative relationship between coordinated 
collective bargaining and the unemployment level. This result supports previous literature on 
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the positive effects of coordinated collective bargaining structures on economic aggregates 
(e.g. Soskice, 1990; Traxler et al., 2001). For the models which consider fixed effects, i.e. 
models (3a) and (4b), no robust significant effect of the degree of coordination of collective 
bargaining can be observed. However, this mixed empirical support for the relevance of the 
institutional structures of collective bargaining on unemployment might be explained by the 
fact that much of the explanatory power of these effects is captured by the country FE. The fact 
that we do not find any robust significant effect of the bargaining structure for inflation might 
be due to collective bargaining affecting unemployment more directly than inflation. However, 
an in-depth investigation and a more detailed analysis of the effects of coordination structure 
– going beyond the scope of this study – would be needed to draw such conclusions. Regarding 
the other controls, we see that many other labour relations variables do not appear to have an 
impact on both dependent variables; only for the unemployment rate is there an effect of the 
level of collective bargaining coverage and trade union density. Turning to the economic 
controls, we see that only the effect of economic growth is significant and relatively robust 
over the different models in explaining unemployment and inflation. This result also confirms 
standard economic reasoning on the effect of growth on the two variables.  
We argued that a change in any direction, e.g. towards a more centralized  or decentralized 
institutional structure, leads to a negative effect on economic performance, as in either direction 
trust relationships among actors are disrupted. As this might be considered controversial, we 
tested the effects of different directions of change separately and report the results in model 
(4a) for unemployment and (4b) for inflation. As can be seen the test result confirm our 
hypothesis, as we are able to observe a positive effect on both dependent variables for changes 
in both directions. However, the effect of the change is not symmetrical as well as only 
significant at relatively high p-value. Even though the latter can be explained by the fact that 
the number of observations varies between changes towards decentral and central levels we 
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need to be cautious in our interpretation of the effects, especially regarding the effects on 
inflation. Nonetheless, for both dependent variables we see a stronger effect of changes towards 
more decentralized and uncoordinated forms of collective bargaining while the changes 
towards more centralized and coordinated institutional structures affect economic outcomes far 
less. This result can be explained by the fact that changes towards more centralized and 
coordinated forms of collective bargaining are usually associated with a decrease in the number 
of actors involved in collective bargaining and a lower number of actors reduces the complexity 
of collective bargaining and fosters trust building among actors. Thus a change towards more 
coordinated and centralized institutional structure of collective bargaining is as detrimental to 
the efficacy of collective bargaining as a change towards more uncoordinated and decentral 
institutional structures. Since the latter increases the number of actors, we argue that this 
increases uncertainty and makes trust building among a larger number of actors more difficult.  
In sum, we find that institutional change has a clear detrimental effect on unemployment and 
inflation and this effect is maintained regardless of whether the instability results from a change 
in the institutional structure towards more coordination or less. In line with other scholars (e.g. 
Farrell, 2009; Blanchard et al., 2014), we argue that the relationship between institutional 
changes in collective bargaining and macroeconomic performance works through a loss of trust 
amongst actors which in turn results in collective action problems and increased transaction 
costs in labour markets. However, the magnitude of this effect differs not only between 
countries but also between different directions of change. Given that the majority of changes 
in the past decades were made towards more decentralized and uncoordinated institutional 
structures of collective bargaining, changes might actually have left bargaining systems – at 





In this article, we argued that change to collective bargaining systems, i.e. of institutional 
structures and processes of collective bargaining on wages, is costly because it leads to a 
disruption of mutual trust between actors which is a prerequisite for the provision of public 
goods, such as a wage strategy which is of mutual interest. The findings show that institutional 
change of collective bargaining systems is associated with an impaired efficacy and thus 
negative economic effects. The effects are strong and robust for both inflation and 
unemployment.  
Our findings imply that standard reasoning on the need for institutional reform of collective 
bargaining clearly underestimates the costs of the reform itself. The results in this work also 
show that institutional change in the ’right’ direction does not necessarily lead to better 
economic outcomes per se! Any positive effect from a better performing institutional structure 
is likely to be dampened by the cost of the change – at least in the short-to-medium term and 
in particular for changes towards more decentralized and uncoordinated institutional structures 
of collective bargaining. As the negative effect of change can be expected to be of a temporary 
nature – since mutual trust about expected behaviour can be rebuilt – as well as can be expected 
to vary between different countries  the results of this study do not support any deadlock in 
institutional reform of collective bargaining systems. Especially because sometimes 
institutional change and short run instability is needed in order to achieve long term stability 
(e.g. Berggren et al., 2012). The same argument holds also for institution-building which is 
needed in order to reduce uncertainty in markets and achieve beneficial macroeconomic 
outcomes (e.g. Onaran and Stockhammer, 2016).  
Academic and political debates about the economic effects of different collective bargaining 
systems have - until now - focused almost entirely on the effects of the institutional 
characteristics of the systems themselves. Even though there is no generally accepted 
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agreement upon which collective bargaining systems prove to be the ’best’ in terms of 
achieving beneficial macroeconomic outcomes (e.g. Blanchard et al., 2014), ‘selected’ studies 
were a source of institutional reform. However, the theoretical and empirical foundations for 
expecting beneficial economic results from these changes are not fully convincing. In part, this 
is due to the fact that the macroeconomic effect of change itself has largely been neglected in 
existing studies and therefore policy makers might have initiated institutional changes without 
assessing the full costs and benefits of the change.  
Our findings therefore have clear policy implications. Policymakers should avoid reforming 
collective bargaining institutions if they do not know what the costs of the change are and 
should be very careful in following their reform agenda along the changing ’Zeitgeist’. In 
particular, and in line with Rodrik (1996), policymakers should consider the country specific 
context and not follow ‘one system fits all’ recommendations on institutional reform because, 
as shown in our analysis, the efficacy of collective bargaining institutions rest heavily on a 
stable institutional environment and stable relationships among actors which evolved over a 
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Percentage of years 
with no change3 
Predominant level4 
Australia 6 1965 88% company-wide/uncoordinated 
Austria 1 1965 98% industry-wide/coordinated 
Belgium 8 1965 84% industry-wide/coordinated 
Bulgaria 3 1992 86% company-wide/uncoordinated 
Canada 2 1965 96% company-wide/uncoordinated 
Cyprus 0 1990 100% company-wide/uncoordinated 
Czech Republic 2 1990 92% company-wide/uncoordinated 
Denmark 13 1965 73% industry-wide/coordinated 
Estonia 0 1991 100% company-wide/uncoordinated 
Finland 19 1965 61% industry-wide/coordinated 
France 4 1965 92% company-wide/uncoordinated 
Germany 0 1965 100% industry-wide/coordinated 
Greece 2 1975 95% industry-wide/uncoordinated 
Hungary 1 1990 96% company-wide/uncoordinated 
Ireland 9 1965 82% industry-wide/uncoordinated 
Italy 5 1965 90% company-wide/uncoordinated 
Japan 2 1965 96% industry-wide/coordinated 
Latvia 0 1993 100% company-wide/uncoordinated 
Lithuania 0 1993 100% company-wide/uncoordinated 
Luxembourg 6 1965 88% company-wide/coordinated 
Malta 0 1990 100% company-wide/uncoordinated 
Netherlands 11 1965 78% industry-wide/coordinated 
New Zealand 7 1965 86% company-wide/uncoordinated 
Norway 22 1965 55% industry-wide/coordinated 
Poland 0 1990 100% company-wide/uncoordinated 
Portugal 13 1978 64% industry-wide/uncoordinated 
Romania 6 1993 71% company-wide/uncoordinated 
Slovakia 5 1990 79% industry-wide/uncoordinated 
Slovenia 4 1990 83% industry-wide/coordinated 
Spain 7 1977 81% industry-wide/uncoordinated 
Sweden 7 1965 86% industry-wide/coordinated 
Switzerland 1 1965 98% industry-wide/coordinated 
UK 7 1965 86% company-wide/uncoordinated 
USA 2 1965 96% company-wide/uncoordinated 
Note: 1Shows how often the structure of coordination of collective bargaining was changed. 2Shows 
since when data is available. 3Shows the time (in percentages) in which there was no change of collective 
bargaining coordination. 4Shows the most frequent coordination structure during the period of analysis. 
Data source: Visser (2017). 
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Table 2. Granger causality tests between institutional change and economic outcomes 
   Lags: 2   Lags: 4   Lags: 6  
Null Hypothesis:  NxT F-Statistic  Obs F-Statistic  NxT F-Statistic  
Change does not Granger Cause Unemployment  1052 0.5378  940  0.4802  869  0.9072  
Unemployment does not Granger Cause Change   1.4698    0.6345    0.8823  
           
Change does not Granger Cause Inflation  1057 5.9548***  941  3.1116**  869  1.9772*  
Inflation does not Granger Cause Change   0.1280    0.1680    0.1704  
           
Note: The F-statistics are the Wald statistics for the joint hypothesis for each equation. ***α ≤ .01; ** α ≤ .05, * α ≤ .1. N x T: number of observations.  
 
 26 
Table 3. The effects of institutional change on unemployment and inflation, 34 countries, 
1965-2014 
Dependent variable: Unemployment rate  Inflation 
Model: (1a)  (2a)  (3a)  (4a)    (1b)  (2b)  (3b)  (4b) 
Collective bargaining: 
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N x T 1209  1200  1198  1198    1205  1200  1198  1198 
F-statistic 2054.450  1849.435  518.3274  5672557    100.8123  100.7110  27.0392  26.5392 
Prob (F-Statistic) 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000    0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
Instrument rank   14  48  49      14  48  49 
Prob (J-statistic)   0.0713  0.0000  0.1933      0.9873  0.7263  0.8853 
R-squared 0.9572          0.5239       
Note: Dependent on the model and dependent variable different estimation strategies are used: 
OLS or TSLS (union authority as instrument), panel-corrected and cross-section weighted 
standard errors (in parentheses). On basis of different models and estimation strategies 
presentational adjustments were made which includes that different validity indicators are 
presented. Variables are lagged by one year. In all FE models country dummies are included 
and Germany - as an example of a country with no changes - is used reference. ***α ≤ .01; ** 
α ≤ .05, * α ≤ .1. N x T: number of observations. Data source: interpolated collective bargaining 
and labour relations from Visser (2017) and economic variables from European Commission 
(2017). 
 
